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This thesis examines the increasing dependence of the
United States on foreign sources of major fuel and non-fuel
mineral resources which appear to have potential requirements
for deepwater ports and terminals. Major oceanborne bulk
commodity import projections for crude petroleum, iron ore,
bauxite, and alumina are presented. Principal bulk commodity
ports are identified and major commodity movements are dis-
cussed. Past and possible future trends in the construction
of large ocean bulk carriers are reviewed. Construction and
transportation economies available via "super" bulk carriers
are examined with emphasis on "super" tankers. The primary
consequences of a failure to provide United States facilities
to accommodate "super" bulk carriers are identified and re-
cent events in U.S. development of deepwater ports are
presented. The major conclusion is, the United States, if
it is to maintain its status as a leading economic power,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, as the world's leading industrial
power, is also the world's major consumer of both fuel and
non-fuel mineral resources. Since 1945 the population of
the United States has approximately doubled; the annual
consumption of fuel resources, however, has grown more than
two and a half times. [Ref. 1, p. 2] During this same"
period the United States consumed more metal ore resources
than the entire human race had prior to that time. [Ref. 2,
p. 1] Although the United States is still fundamentally
self-sufficient in a number of important fuel and non-fuel
mineral resources, the era of self-sufficiency appears to
be changing to an era of increasing import-dependency.
There appears to have been two primary reasons for the
recent technological revolution in the world's shipbuilding
industry. First, has been the increasing import-dependence
by many of the industrial nations for sources of bulk min-
eral resources, and second, the two closings of the Suez
Canal. As a result of the technological revolution very
impressive ships have recently joined the world's merchant
fleets to transport both dry and bulk commodities . The most
Numbers in parentheses designate reference and page
numbers. References are listed in the List of References
at the end of the paper.
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2impressive are the very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and
the multi-purpose oil/ore and oil/bulk/ore (0B0) carriers.
These deep draft "super" bulk carriers have become the work-
horses of the world bulk shipping fleet. However, their
progressively deeper drafts have rendered many of the world's
ports obsolete. In order to capitalize on the economies of
scale available via "super" bulk carriers, many of the
world's maritime dependent nations have modified existing,
or constructed new ports and terminals to accommodate these
deep draft vessels. Thus the economies of "super" bulk car-
riers have enabled Japan and European countries, to depend
increasingly on more remote sources of mineral resources.
The United States must compete with countries which have
facilities to accommodate "super" bulk carriers. However,
the United States, the world's leading industrial power, has
yet to provide facilities for these deep draft vessels. The
purpose of this thesis is to research: (1) the increasing
import-dependence of the United States on foreign sources of
major bulk fuel and non-fuel mineral resources which appear
to have potential requirements for deepwater ports or termi-
nals, (2) principal bulk commodity ports and commodity move-
ments, (3) trends in the construction of ocean bulk carriers,
(4) the economics of "super" bulk carriers, (5) the conse-
quences of the United States not providing adequate facilities
Oil tankers ranging from 200,000 to 500,000 DWT (dead-
weight tons) the carrying capacity of a vessel in tons of
2,240 pounds. It is the difference between the light ship
weight and the displacement fully loaded.
11

to accommodate "super" bulk carriers and (6) recent events





Research methodology- consisted primarily of a literature
search. Computerized searches were conducted at the Defense
Documentation Center and the Naval Postgraduate School li-
brary. In addition all National Technical Information Ser-
vice indexes were searched for the period January 1970 thru
February 1974. Pertinent studies and publications were
ordered and reviewed. A periodical and newspaper search was
also conducted for the same time period at the Naval Post-
graduate School library. A field trip to the San Francisco
Bay area was also undertaken. Personal discussions were
held with key personnel at the Western Regional Office of
the Maritime Administration, the South Pacific Division of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Marconaflo Division
of the Marcona Corporation.
Phone conversations were held with experts on the sub-
ject of deepwater port development at the Headquarters of
the Maritime Administration; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Institute of Water Resources; and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration. There have been numerous com-
prehensive studies undertaken on the subject of deepwater
port development. Appendix A reflects only the major
studies of which the author has knowledge. The thesis
should in no way be considered as the final word in deep-
water port development. The presentation should, however,
13





III. UNITED STATES IMPORT-DEPENDENCE FOR MINERAL RESOURCES
A. IMPORT-DEPENDENCE FOR NON-FUEL MINERAL RESOURCES
The United States first became a net importer of metals
during the 1920' s. By 1970 the United States imported ap-
proximately 40% of its metal ore requirements and more than
half of its supply of six of 13 basic non-fuel mineral re-
sources required by an industrialized society (aluminum,
chromium, manganese, nickel, tin, and zinc). [Ref. 2, p. 1]
As indicated in Table I, the United States in 1970, was also
import -dependent for many other important non-fuel mineral
resources
.
According to the Department of the Interior, by 1985,
the United States will, most likely, become import-dependent
for more than half of its supply of three additional basic
non-fuel mineral resources required by an industrialized
society (iron, lead, and tungsten). The Department further
predicts by the year 2000 three more non-fuel mineral re-
sources will have been added to this growing list (copper,
potassium, and sulfur). [Ref. 2, p. 1] If these predic-
tions are correct by the year 2000 the United States will
have become import- dependent for over half of its supply
of 12 of 13 basic non-fuel mineral resources presently re-
quired by an industrialized society. These projections
were based on the assumption that consumption requirements
would continue to increase in the future. The warning signs
15

Table I. U.S. Import-Dependence and Share in World Con-
sumption of Major Minerals (in percentages)
Share of Imports Imports as U.S. Share in
in Primary Percent of World Metal
Mineral Supply Consumption Consumption














(Bauxite) 66 90 91
Antimony 63 89 94
Asbestos 100 100 83
Beryllium 82 - 51
Cadmium 51 68 53
Chromium 99 100 100
Cobalt 90 95 93
Columbium 100 100 100
Copper 40 9 6
Fluorspar 3 57 -. 86 78
Iron Ore a 14 31 33
Lead 38 42 38
Manganese 77 93 99
Mercury 90 58 38
Mica 99 100 100
Molybdenum
Nickel 99 90 87
Platinum 93 97 98
Rutile - - 100
Selenium - - 29
Silver 69 58 27
Tantalum 100 100 100
Tellurium - - 20
Tin 99 99 100
Tungsten 40 52 -
Vanadium 1 26 22




Note: a. Data for 1950 represent share of imports in gross
supply in 1955, while data for 1969 represent share
of imports in gross supply in 1969.
Source: Alexander Lang, "A Crisis in Critical Commodities,"
Columbia Journal of World Business
,
Vol. Ill No. 1,
(Spring 1973), p. 44. (Original Sources
-
Defense Pro-
duction Act Progress Report-Nr. 50 -Potential Shortages
of Ores, Metals, Minerals and 1-nergy Resources , U.S.
Government Printing Office, U.S. Department of the
Interior, 1971 and Mineral Yearbook 1969 , U.S. De-
partment of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 197]').
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are up and there is an obvious need to reorder the consumption
requirements of these vital resources.
Of all the non-fuel mineral resources the United States
will import in the future iron ore and bauxite/alumina will,
most likely, be required in the largest bulk quantities.
[Ref. 3, Vol. I, p. 26] In 1969 the United States imported,
via ocean bulk carrier, approximately 29 million short tons
(MST) of iron ore, 1.8 MST of alumina and 16.3 MST of bauxite.
Robert R. Nathan Associates recently predicted the United
States annual oceanborne imports of standard iron ore
(631 Fe) will, most likely, reach 34.1 MST by 1980 and 48.3
MST by the year 2000. 3 [Ref. 3, Vol. I, p. 26] These pro-
jections compare very favorably with predictions recently
made by Soros Associates. (See Drawing 1 for Soros As-
sociates predictions of annual oceanborne iron ore imports
to the year 2000.)
The United States has recently been importing approxi-
mately 50% of its iron ore from Canada, however, much of the
Canadian ore is as low grade as Lake Superior ore and is
therefore beneficiated and pelletized. Numerous U.S. steel
corporations have high grade iron ore holdings in such
3
"Key assumptions underlying projections of seaborne
imports of iron ore are a compound average growth rate of
2.25 percent from 1970 to 2000 in U.S. consumption of fin-
ished steel; continuation of combined raw material and
finished product delivery costs as a basic determinant of
the location of steel plants for U.S. and Canadian iron




Drawing 1. Projected Annual Oceanborne Imports of Iron Ore






















Soros Associates, Inc. Offshore Terminal System Con-
cepts
,
prepared for the U.S. Department of Commerce,




countries as Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Chile, New Zealand,
Liberia, and Australia. In the future these countries are
expected to become more important suppliers of iron ore.
[Ref. 3, Vol. II, p. 264]
Robert R. Nathan Associates recently predicted the
United States annual oceanborne imports of alumina will,
most likely, reach 5.7 MST by 1980 and 15.2 MST by the year
2000. Predictions for annual oceanborne imports of alumina
are for 15.9 MST by 1980 and for 15.9 MST by the year 2000. 4
[Ref. 3, Vol. I, p. 16] (See Table II and Drawing 2 for
other predictions by Stanford Research, Booz-Allen, Litton
Systems and Soros Associates.)
In recent years countries in the Caribbean (Jamaica,
Dominican Republic, and Haiti) and South America (Surinam
and Guyana) have been the major sources of the United States
supply of bauxite and alumina. However, in the near future
the United States will, most likely, import progressively
more bauxite from Australia and Africa (Guinea and Ghana)
.
[Ref. 3, Vol. II, p. 309-310]
Key assumptions: "Imports of both alumina and bauxite
are expected to be constrained by policies of the less de-
veloped producing countries requiring the indigenous pro-
cessing of aluminum raw materials. Other key assumptions
underlying the projected imports are that annual growth of
U.S. aluminum consumption would progressively decline from
8 percent in 1970 to 4 percent in 1990 and 2000; aluminum
imports would increase from approximately 10 percent of
consumption in 1970 to 15 percent in 1980 and 27 percent
in 2000; and primary aluminum production would increase
from roughly 4 million tons in 1970 to 11.5 million tons in
2000." [Ref. 3, Vol. I, p. 29-30]
19

Table II. Comparative Estimates of U.S. Imports of Bauxite
and Alumina






n. a. 15.9 n. a. 15.9
n.. a. 18.2 n. a. 22.7
n. a. 5.7 n.a. 15.2
n. a. 6.5 n. a. 18.0



















Bureau of Mines n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a,
n.a. 8.0 8.0 n. a
n.a. 10.5 10.1 n. a
n.a. 15.6 17.6 n.a
n.a. 1.2 1.2 n. a
n.a. 8.6 18.7 n. a









a/ Robert R. Nathan Associates
Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwater Port
Study
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
,
August 1972. (Original Sources - Stanford Research
Institute, Principal U.S. Dry Bulk Commodity Sea -
borne ImporFs and Exports for 1975 and 1995
,
pre-
pared for U.S~ Department of Commerce, Maritime
Administration. Booz-Allen Applied Research Inc.,
Forecast of U.S. Oceanborne Foreign Trade in Dry
Bulk Commodities
,
prepared for U.S. Department of
Interior. Litton Systems Inc., Oceanborne Shipping
Demand and Technology Forecast
,
prepared for U.S.
Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration.)
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Drawing 2. Projected Annual Oceanborne Imports of Bauxite
and Alumina to the Year 2000 (millions-short tons)
2000
YEAR
Source: Soros Associates Inc. Offshore Terminal System Con -
cepts
,
prepared for the U.S. Department of Commerce,




The problem of import- dependence for supplies of non-
fuel mineral resources is to a large extent economic. The
United States still has large known and potential reserves
of many non-fuel mineral resources. However the accessi-
bility and quality of the remaining resources is progres-
sively declining, and the cost of exploration, development,
and exploitation are steadily increasing. [Ref. 4, p. 45]
The easily accessible high grade iron ore once mined at the
Mesabi Range has for the most part been depleted. Copper
ore with less than 1% copper is presently being mined in
the United States. A decade ago copper ore would not have
been mined unless it contained in excess of 2% copper.
[Ref. 5, p. 109]
In order to mine progressively lower grade ore, propor-
tionately larger volumes of earth must be disturbed. This
problem has been the subject of great controversy between
ecologists and the mining industry. There is, of course,
another source of metals to be "mined" and this is through
recycling. For all the publicity recycling has recently
received the results have not been impressive. For example,
all the aluminum cans brought to recycling centers have only
provided approximately one tenth of the current production
needs. There presently are no significant economic incen-
tives in the United States for making large scale recycling
financially attractive. [Ref. 5, p. 174] There have re-
cently been numerous suggestions on methods to make recy-
cling financially attractive. Establishing tax incentives
22

for recycling to compete with the depletion allowance of
mined ore and lowering freight rates for recyclable scrap
to rates similar to mined ore have been two suggestions.
Raising ecological costs in mining operations by requiring
the restoration of mined areas to their original condition
would also encourage recycling.
B. IMPORT-DEPENDENCE FOR FUEL MINERAL RESOURCES
The United States is the world's major consumer of fuel
mineral resources. In 1970 the United States consumed 431
of the energy and 36.71 of the petroleum used in the free
world. However, in 1970 the population of the United States
comprised only 8.31 of the entire free world population.
[Ref. 6, p. 23] In 1971 the United States consumed approxi-
mately 5,523 million barrels of petroleum, 22,050 billion
cubic feet of natural gas and 510.8 MST of coal. [Ref. 7,
p. 18] As indicated in Table III, the Department of the
Interior anticipates that the consumption of all three fuel
mineral resources will increase in the future.
The United States has vast coal reserves and has for
many years been a net exporter. In 1969 the United States
exported 56.2 MST of coal and exports increased to 70.9 MST
in 1970. [Ref. 1, p. 4] It is anticipated that the United
All data available from the U.S. Government and industry
are expressed in terms of 42 gallon barrels.
These predictions were made in 1972 prior to the
Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) embargo
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States will remain self-sufficient for supplies of coal in
the future. However, the United States is import- dependent
for supplies of both natural gas and petroleum. Since the
thesis is limited to only those bulk commodities which ap-
pear to have a potential requirement for deepwater ports,
natural gas import-dependency will not be discussed.
In 1970 the United States was import-dependent for ap-
proximately 1.3 million barrels per day (MM B/D) of crude
petroleum. [Ref. 3, Vol. II, p. 57] By 1971 crude imports
had increased to approximately 3.9 MM B/D. [Ref. 7, p. 18]
In 1972 this figure was approximately 4 . 7 MM B/D; over 25%
of the United States crude petroleum requirements. [Ref. 8,
p. 781] Robert R. Nathan Associates recently predicted the
United States daily oceanborne imports of crude petroleum
will, most likely, reach 6.9 MM B/D by 1980 and 19.7 MM B/D
by the year 2000. 7 ' 8 [Ref. 3, Vol. II, p. 73] Numerous
7
"Projections assume no change in Governmental policies
affecting exploration for and development of petroleum and
natural gas resources in the United States. The rate of
growth of petroleum consumption after 1980 is assumed to de-
cline to an average of 2.1 percent annually from long-term
past growth rates of approximately 4 percent. There is a
further assumption that the downward trend in the volume of
crude petroleum production would be reversed, and that com-
mercial supplies of petroleum products would be available
from petroleum shale and synthesis of coal. Should these
assumptions prove to be invalid, import requirements would
be more or less than projected." [Ref. 4, Vol. I, p. 26-27]
gThese prediction were made in 1972 prior to the OPEC




projections of United States future crude petroleum import re
quirements have recently been computed. Table IV contains
projected import requirements computed by the Department of
the Interior and the National Petroleum Council. (See
Drawing 3 for Soros Associates projections to the year
92000.) All projections included have assumed completion
of the Alaska pipeline.
As a result of the recent OPEC embargo President Nixon
has launched Project Independence, an effort to make the
United States self-sufficient in energy resources by 1980.
There has, however, been no formal plan revealed as to how
this project will be implemented. A recent article in the
Wall Street Journal stated, "Achieving energy self-suffi-
ciency by 1980, or even 1985, would impose serious strains
and huge costs on the American economy. Project Indepen-
dence has sweeping implications for the cost of living,
government spending, the quality of the environment and the
nations economic ties to the rest of the world." [Ref. 9,
p. 1] A large number of energy officials within the admin-
istration and also in private business believe the 1980
figure is overly optimistic for such a major project. S.
David Freedman, a former White House energy policy chief,
was recently quoted by the Wall Street Journal as stating,
"The 1980 target date is completely unrealistic!" [Ref. 9,
These predictions were made in 19 7 2 prior to the OPEC





























































a/ National Petroleum Council (Total imports of crude petroleum)
CASE I - Based on very optimistic assumptions concerning
supplies of coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy including
resolution of environmental controversies, availability of
governmental land for energy resource development, adequate
price and tax incentives, and a high degree of success in
locating undiscovered resources.
CASE II - Based on less optimistic assumptions regarding
energy sources competing with petroleum, but these, never-
theless, are more favorable than factors presently influenc-
ing energy supplies.
CASE III- Considered the most likely outcome, is based
on the assumption that the present policies will continue.
the assumption that there will be a
availability of fuels other than
highest level of petroleum imports
CASE IV - Based on
sharp reduction in the
petroleum and that the
will be required.
b/ Department of the Interior (Total waterborne crude petroleum
imports)
CASE I - No stimulation of U.S. oil and gas production.
CASE II - Maximum stimulation of U.S. oil and gas pro-
duction
.
c_/ Robert R. Nathan Associates (Total waterborne imports)
SOURCES: Mobil Oil Corp. - Statement by Dr. D. H. Clewell,
Senior Vice President, Mobil Oil Corp. at NOAA "The Oceans
and National Economic Development" conference 17 July 1973.
(Original Source - National Petroleum Council study - U.S.
Energy Outlook
, 1971.) U.S. Department of the Interior -
statement by J. Norton, Assistant Secretary for Land and
Water Resources, Department of the Interior before House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, 12 June 1973.
(Original source - Department of the Interior - United States
Energy Through Year 2000, Government Printing Office, 1972.)
Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwater Port Study
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, August 19 7 2.
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Drawing 3. Projected Annual Oceanborne Imports of Crude Oil
to the Year 2000 (millions of barrels per day
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Source: Soros Associates, Inc. Offshore Terminal System
Concepts
,
prepared for the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Maritime Administration, September 1972,
Executive Summary, Pig. 1-1.
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p. 2] If Project Independence is implemented and does in
fact become a reality the various projections in Table IV
and Drawing 3 will not be accurate.
Canada and Venezuela have in the past been the major
source of the United States' imported crude petroleum. How-
ever, the United States has recently been importing progres-
sively greater quantities from countries in Africa, the
Middle East and the Far East. Robert R. Nathan Associates
recently predicted that by 1980 the United States will be
importing approximately 71% of its imported crude oil re-
quirements from these three geographical areas. [Ref 3,
Vol. II, p. 73] Approximately 85% of the free world's known
crude oil reserves are located in the Middle East, Africa,
and Southeast Asia. [Ref. 8, p. 781]
As was the case with non-fuel mineral resources, import-
dependence for fuel mineral resources is also to a large
extent economic. [Ref 4, p. 45] Vast reserves of coal,
natural gas, and petroleum remain either beneath or offshore
the United States. However, the accessibility of these fuel
resources is progressively declining, and the costs of ex-
ploration, development, and exploitation are increasing.
Environmental pressure and legislation is also acting as a
deterent to expanded fuel resource extraction. Due to eco-
nomic and environmental considerations the United States
will, at least for the near future, remain import- dependent
for millions of barrels of crude petroleum per day.
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C. CHANGING GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN OF IMPORTED MINERAL RESOURCES
For many years the United States has been fortunate to
receive the majority of its imported fuel and non-fuel min-
eral resources from Canada, Latin America, and Caribbean
countries. [Ref 4, p. 46] As indicated in Table V, the
vast majority of these resources imported by the United
States in 1970 originated in the Western Hemisphere. As a
result of this fortunate situation, transportation costs
for these basic mineral resources were relatively low. How-
ever, this situation has been gradually changing as our
Western Hemisphere neighbors are becoming more highly in-
dustrialized and are, therefore, using a greater share of
their mineral resources. The recent trend in the origin of
imported mineral resources, as indicated previously, is away
from the Western Hemisphere countries and toward Australia,
New Zealand, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
[Ref. 4, p. 46] The trend in the future is expected to be
toward longer shipping distances for fuel and non-fuel min-
eral resource imports. This trend is not unique to the United
States, as indicated on Table VI, this trend is occurring
throughout the world
D. INCREASING COMPETITION IN THE WORLD MARKET FOR MINERAL
RESOURCES
The United States is not the only major industrial coun-
try that is becoming progressively more dependent on foreign
fuel and non-fuel mineral resources. For example, Japan and
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for years. As their economies continue to expand import
requirements will, most likely, continue to increase. The
less developed countries, which are a primary source of much
of the world's high grade mineral resources, are also ex-
panding their industrial bases and raising their standards
of living. Their annual consumption growth rates of mineral
resources will, most likely, surpass the rates of many of
the industrialized nations. (See Table VII.) Due to the
ever increasing world aggregate demand for mineral resources,
the world market place for mineral resources is becoming
progressively more competitive. The United States, as it
continues to become more import-dependent, will be forced to
bargain for mineral resources in a highly competitive market
place.
Table VII. Annual Growth Rates for Consumption of Major
Minerals in Selected Countries, 1964-69
(In percentages)
USA France Italy
Petroleum 5.0 11.1 9.7
Copper 3.0 2.5 3.7
Lead 5.0 2.9 11.8
Zinc 2.5 3.3 6.4
Nickel - 9.2 13.8
Aluminum 7.5 8.0 13.8
Steel 3.3 5.3 11.6
GNP a 4.6 5.5 5.4 4.7 2.3 10.9
Note: a. In constant prices.
Source: Alexander Lang, "A Crisis in Critical Commodities,"
Columbia Journal of World Business , Vol. Ill, No. 1,
(Spring 1973) pT 49"! (Original source - Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, "White
Paper on Prospect of National Resources Problems in
Japan," Trade and Industry of Japan-Economic Reports ,
No. 167, 1972.)
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IV. PRINCIPAL BULK COMMODITY PORTS AND COMMODITY MOVEMENTS
A. EAST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES
The principal bulk commodity ports on the east coast are
Portland, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Paulsboro, Marcus
Hook, Baltimore, Hampton Roads, Charleston, Savannah, Jack-
sonville and Port Everglades. [Ref. 3, Vol. Ill, p. 21-69]
(See Table VIII for depth of water in main channels.) Ex-
isting main channel depths vary from a minimum of 35 to a
maximum of 45 feet. Thus channel depths limit the maximum
size of fully laden bulk carriers to approximately 80,000
DWT.
The major bulk commodity movements through ports in the
New England and New York Harbor area are receipts of domestic
and foreign crude and petroleum products and domestic coal.
The majority of crude petroleum is received at Portland for
further delivery to Canadian refineries via pipeline. Since
this region has very limited refining capacity most of the
petroleum received is in the form of finished products.
[Ref. 3, Vol. Ill, p. 20-21]
The major bulk commodity movements through ports in the
Delaware Bay and River area are foreign and domestic crude
and petroleum products. However, due to the refining ca-
pacity in this area more crude is received than finished
products. The port of Philadelphia also receives substan-
tial shipments of iron ore. [Ref. 3, Vol. Ill, p. 20-21]
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Table VIII. Main Channel Depths of Principal Bulk Commodity-
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Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwater Port
Study
,
Vol. Ill, prepared for the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Institute of Water Resources,
August 1972.
In the Chesapeake Bay area the movement of bulk commod-
ities is dominated by exports of coal from the ports of
Baltimore and Hampton Roads and the receipt of iron ore at
Baltimore. Foreign and domestic crude and petroleum pro-
ducts are also received, primarily at Newport News and
Baltimore. [Ref. 3, Vol. Ill, p. 20-21]
The region between the port of New York and Hampton
Roads is very heavily industrialized. In 1970 the ports in
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this region handled over 901 of all U.S. coal exports and
over 801 and 50% of the total iron ore and crude petroleum
imports respectively. During the period between 1970 and
1980 the Maritime Administration has predicted the foreign
traffic through these ports will increase by 135% for crude
petroleum, 30% for coal, and 22% for iron ore. [Ref. 10,
P. 1]
In the south Atlantic ports the major bulk commodity
movements are the receipt of foreign and domestic crude and
petroleum products and the export of grain and phosphate
rock. The receipt of petroleum products is far greater than
crude due to the very limited refining capacity in this area,
[Ref. 3, Vol. Ill, p. 68-69]
In 1970 the total demand for petroleum products in the
United States was approximately 14 . 7 MM B/D. The 16 eastern
most states which make up Petroleum Administration for De-
fense District I, (PAD I) consumed approximately 5.85 MM B/D
or 40% of all petroleum products consumed in the United
States. [Ref. 3, Vol. II, p. 38] PAD I depends heavily on
both domestic and foreign sources of finished petroleum pro-
ducts since existing refining capacity can only supply one
quarter on the district's demand. In the past, the majority
of the crude petroleum supplied to PAD I refineries, was
from the Gulf states. However, due to a reduced supply of
domestic crude from the Gulf states, more crude has recently
been imported. This trend is expected to continue in the
future. PAD I refineries are primarily located on coastal
36

and waterway areas in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Delaware. Three quarters of the refinery capacity in
PAD I is served through the Delaware Bay and River.
B. GULF COAST OF THE UNITED STATES
The principal bulk commodity ports on the Gulf Coast are
Tampa, Mobile, New Orleans (and other Mississippi ports).
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Galveston-Houston, Port Lavaca, Corpus
Christi and Brownsville. [Ref. 3, Vol. Ill, p. 96-97]
(See Table VIII for depth of water in main channels.) Ex-
isting main channel depths vary from a minimum of 34 to a
maximum of 47 feet. Thus channel depths limit the maximum
size of fully laden bulk carriers to approximately 80,000
DWT.
The major bulk commodity movements through ports in
western Florida and Alabama are exports of phosphate rock
from Tampa and grain from Mobile and the receipt of petrole-
um products and coal in Tampa and iron ore and bauxite in
Mobile. In Louisiana ports the major bulk commodity ship-
ments are grain and petroleum products and the major re-
ceipt is bauxite. In the Texas ports the major shipments
are limited to grains and petroleum products and the major
receipt is bauxite. [Ref. 2, Vol. Ill, p. 96-97] The Gulf
coast states of Louisiana , Texas , and Alabama receive approxi
mately 951 of all bauxite imported by the United States.
Tampa exports approximately 80% of all phosphate rock ex-
ported by the United States.
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The major refining centers on the Gulf coast are located
in the Houston, Beaumont, Port Arthur, Corpus Christi, New
Orleans, Baton Rouge, Lake Charles and Pascagoula. The Gulf
coast states until recently, had been self-sufficient in
crude petroleum. However, now more foreign crude is progres-
sively being imported. By 1980 states in the Gulf coast will,
most likely, be importing approximately 3 MM B/D. [Ref. 2,
Vol. II, p. 49]
C. WEST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES
The principal bulk commodity ports on the west coast are
Long Beach, Los Angeles, Richmond, Portland, Tacoma and
Seattle. [Ref. 3, Vol. Ill, p. 144-145] (See Table VIII
for depth of water in main channels.) Existing main channel
depths vary from a minimum of 30 to a maximum of 62 feet.
Ports at Ferndale, Oregon and the California ports of Rich-
mond and Los Angeles can accommodate fully laden bulk car-
riers up to 100,000 DWT . Long Beach can accommodate fully
laden bulk carriers up to 130,000 DWT. There are approxi-
mately nineteen offshore tanker terminals on the coast of
California. [Ref. 11, p. 723] Most of the terminals con-
sist of conventional buoy moorings with submerged pipelines.
However, none of these terminals is considered to be a deep-
water facility since the largest tankers that can be accom-
modated are 130,000 DWT. [Ref. 12, p. 41]
The major bulk commodity movements through ports in
California arc the receipt of crude and petroleum products
and shipment of petroleum products. In the Washington and
38

Oregon ports the major bulk commodity movements are the ex-
port of grains and the receipt of petroleum products and
alumina. [Ref 3, Vol. Ill, p. 144-145]
The domestic production of crude petroleum by west coast
states has been declining. California has been the largest
producer of crude petroleum of all western states, however
production of crude has been declining since 1968. Until
completion of the Alaska pipeline, foreign sources of pe-
troleum will, most likely, increase. In 1970 approximately
0.3 MM B/D were imported, by 1980 the Corps of Engineers
have predicted that foreign imports for west coast states
may reach 2 MM B/D. Ninety five percent of the west coast
refining capacity is located in the three major service
areas of Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles-Long
Beach. [Ref. 12, p. 21]
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V. CONSTRUCTION OF OCEAN BULK CARRIERS
A. RECENT HISTORY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF OCEAN BULK CARRIERS
During the years immediately following World War II
emphasis was placed on rebuilding the world's merchant
fleet, however there was little incentive or time for ex-
perimentation. During the late 'forties and 'fifties the
world's merchant fleet was rebuilt largely along traditional
lines. [Ref 13, p. 153] Until 1957 most ocean bulk car-
riers were limited in size to transit the Suez Canal. How-
ever, the growing dependence by many of the world's industrial
nations on foreign mineral resources and the closing of the
Suez Canal in November of 1957 added new impetus for change
in shipbuilding. Even though the Suez Canal was closed for
a relatively short duration it was evident to the Northern
European countries and to a lesser extent the United States,
that the long route from the Persian Gulf oil supply around
the coast of Africa was unsatisfactory. Since the shipment
of crude petroleum dominated world bulk trade and supplies
of petroleum were being placed in jeopardy, tanker con-
struction received top priority.
Without the size limitation of the Suez Canal as a con-
straint shipbuilders began to build progressively larger
tankers. The Japanese shipyards took the lead and in 1959
launched the 114,365 DWT Universe Apollo. During the 1960's,
shipyards began to incorporate new technologies. Computer
40

aided ship design was used to free the naval architect from
the past practice of making conservative, incremental de-
sign changes. Analytical techniques from the fields of
operations research and systems analysis were also intro-
duced to quantitatively define and compare various ship
and supporting system designs in order to select the optimal
combination. There were also major technological advances
in hull design and fabrication, propulsive machinery, cargo
handling devices and automatic controls. [Ref. 13, p. 156]
As a result of the combined technological improvements, the
competitive nature of the industry, and a considerable amount
of ingenuity, shipyards produced progressively larger and
more efficient bulk cargo ships.
By the end of 1966 there were 23 ocean bulk carriers in
service with a capacity over 100,000 DWT . The second clos-
ing of the Suez Canal in mid-1967 added further impetus to the
construction of more large ocean bulk carriers. During the
four years between 1966 and 1970 the number of ships in the
world fleet with a capacity in excess of 100,000 DWT in-
creased from 23 to 319. (See Table IX.) Of this number
275 were tankers and 44 were either dry bulk or multi-purpose
bulk carriers. In 1970 the largest ships in the worlds
fleets were the six 326,000 DWT tankers of the Universe
Ireland class. These ships were built in Japan with a length
of 1,133 ft., beam of 175 ft. and a draft of 81 ft. Al-
though the size of the dry bulk and the multi-purpose bulk
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Universe Ireland tankers there were seven ships of this type
in the 150,000 to 199,999 DWT range. During the period 1966
to 1970 the number of ocean bulk carriers in operation over
100,000 DWT increased at an average annual rate of 350 per-
cent. [Ref. 10, p. 6]
At the end of 1970, as shown on Table X, there were, in
the over 100,000 DWT class, 279 tankers under construction
or on order averaging 240,000 DWT and 181 dry and multi-
purpose bulk carriers averaging 150,000 DWT. The growth of
large ocean bulk carriers exceeding 100,000 DWT placed under
construction or on order was phenomenal. In 1971 a new,
larger tanker joined the world fleet. The 372,400 DWT
Nesseki Maru, also built in Japan, had a length of 1,243
ft., beam of 177 ft. and a draft of 89 ft. [Ref. 10, p. 7]
In 1972 the 477,000 DWT tanker Globtik Tokyo was launched in
Japan and became the largest ship in the world, with a length
of 1,243 ft., beam of 203 ft. and draft of 92 ft. In 1973
the Globtik London was launched, she is of the same dimen-
sions as her sister ship, the Globtik Tokyo. The Globtik
London and Globtik Tokyo are presently the largest ships
afloat and each has the capacity of almost 3.5 million bar-
rels of crude petroleum. The world's largest multi-purpose
bulk carrier is the 280,000 DWT Svealand built in Sweden and
launched in 1973. The Svealand has a length of 1109 ft.,
beam of 179 ft. and draft of 71 ft. [Ref. 14, p. 121] Dur-
ing the past few years the majority of tankers that have
joined the fleet with a capacity of over 100,000 DWT have
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Table XI. World Tanker Fleet: Size Analysis
No. of Existing No. of Existing
Size Groups (DWT) Tankers Jan. 1971 Tankers Jan. 1973
100,000 - 149,999 108 136
150,000 - 199,999 35 38
200,000 - 249,999 111 204
250,000 - 299,999 15 58
300,000 - 349,999 6 7
350,000 - 399,999 1
400,000 and over 1
TOTAL 275 445
Sources: Ocean Industry, June 1973 and The Economics of
Deepwater Terminals
,
U.S. Department of Commerce,
Maritime Administration, Government Printing
Office, 1972.
United States shipyards have only recently begun con-
structing tankers with capacities over 200,000 DWT. The
Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation recently launched the
225,000 DWT Brooklyn. This is the largest ship ever launch-
ed in the United States, it is 1094 ft. long and has the
capacity to carry 1.5 million barrels of crude petroleum.
The Seatrain yard, located at the old Brooklyn Navy Yard is
also constructing two additional tankers of the same class.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation's Sparrow's Point Yard is pres-
ently building three 265,000 DWT tankers. The estimated
completion date for the first tanker is May 1975. The United
States Government will pay an estimated $19 to $30.5 million
dollars in construction differential subsidies for each of
these six VLCCs, [Ref. 15, p. 9] however, their full load
draft precludes their entry into any U.S. port.
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B. FUTURE TRENDS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF OCEAN BULK CARRIERS
The size of the ocean bulk carriers presently on order
indicates that even larger ships will soon be joining mer-
chant fleets. Shell Oil Company has recently contracted for
the construction of two tankers in France, each with a dead-
weight tonnage of 533,000. Globik, the British-based ship-
ping group recently placed an order for a 706,000 DWT tanker
with IHI - Ishikawajima Heavy Industries of Japan. Drawing
4 shows the size of the largest tankers, bulk carriers and
freighters up to the year 2040 as projected by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration. The num-
bers indicated contain arbitrarily-chosen practical limits
of ships based upon an assessment of the current and poten-
tial state-of-the-art. The limit of ship sizes indicated
shows the possibility of a 1,000,000 DWT tanker by 1982 and
a 400,000 DWT bulk carrier by 1995.
There is little doubt in the shipbuilding industry that
a 1,000,000 DWT tanker is a physical possibility within the
next few years. The Onassis group is presently designing a
million ton tanker. A great deal of discussion has recently
taken place concerning the proposed million ton tanker. One
disadvantage of such a mammoth tanker is its draft, which
will be over 100 ft. (See Drawing 5.) Due to a deeper draft
some of the existing trade routes would become obsolete. For
example, a million ton tanker could not enter the North Sea
via the English channel. IHI, which has built the majority
of the largest tankers presently afloat, claims that a mil-
lion ton tanker would not be economically efficient.
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and Alignment," Journal of Waterways and Harbours
Division, Proceedings of the American Society of
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Source: Soros Associates, Inc. Offshore Terminal System
Concepts, prepared for the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Maritime Administration, September 1972,
Part I, Fig. 1-34.
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The construction price per deadweight ton is presently
at a minimum between 600,000 and 700,000 DWT. Any ship that
is constructed over 800,000 DWT would, most likely, require
twin screws. Due to the loss of economy with twin screws,
IHI claims that the transportation cost per long ton for a
million ton tanker would be approximately equal to the trans-
portation cost per long ton of a single screw 400,000 DWT
tanker. [Ref. 16, p. 27-28]
Although there are a few tankers presently on order above
500,000 DWT, the majority of the tankers on order above
100,000 DWT are in the 250,000 to 300,000 DWT range. (See
Table XII.) As of 1 January 1973 there were 444 tankers on
order with a capacity over 100,000 DWT. The Maritime Admin-
istration indicates that the majority of new tankers to join
the world fleet will, most likely, be under 300,000 DWT.
Tankers constructed with a larger capacity would only be
able to operate on specific routes between the Middle East,
Europe and Japan. These larger ships will, most likely, be
severely limited to a few specialized ports having deepwater
berthing, handling and storage facilities. The Maritime Ad-
ministration believes most of the world's tankers will re-
quire much more operational flexibility and the spiraling
trend to ever larger tankers will level off in the future
and stabilize in the 200,000 to 300,000 DWT range. [Ref. 10,
p. 6] The Maritime Administration expects a similar level-
ing off in the construction of both dry and multi-purpose























October 1973, p. 35.
multi-purpose bulk carriers in service is expected to exceed
150,000 DWT and by 1980 the majority of new bulk carriers
are expected to be within the 200,000 to 300,000 DWT range.
[Ref. 10, p. 7]
Many United States shipyards are presently expanding to
construct larger ocean bulk carriers. Avondale and Sun Ship
are presently expanding to be able to construct 400,000 DWT
ships and Newport News is expanding to construct 600,000 DWT
ships. [Ref. 17, p. 31] Todd Shipyards has recently re-
ceived contracts for six 380,000 DWT tankers and Exxon has
recently submitted a subsidy application to the Maritime Ad-
ministration to construct two 400,000 DWT tankers. In
September of 1973 the Maritime Administration held subsidy




VI. ECONOMICS OF "SUPER" BULK CARRIERS
A. ECONOMIES OF "SUPER" BULK CARRIER CONSTRUCTION
The first analysis of economies of "super" bulk carrier
construction is based on a tanker price study conducted by
Ishikawaj ima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI). IHI is located
in Japan and holds the world's record for constructing the
largest ships afloat, the 477,000 DWT Globtik London and
Globtik Tokyo, Due to the proprietary nature of tanker
price information, IHI did not reveal actual prices.
One of the most influential factors in determining a
tankers price is the hull steel weight. (Hull steel weight
is not to be confused with DWT which is a measure of ships
capacity.) Hull steel weight per DWT decreases as ship ca-
pacity increases up to approximately 250,000 DWT. Above
this point, due to structual considerations, hull steel
weight per DWT increases. Therefore, considering hull steel
weight alone, above 250,000 DWT tanker price increases per
DWT. However, as indicated on Drawing 6, due to other econ-
omies in construction, tanker price per DWT continues to
decrease beyond 250,000 DWT and does not reach a minimum
until approximately 600,000 to 700,000 DWT. Above 700,000
DWT tanker price per DWT increases. From a technical point
of view, IHI considers twin propeller propulsion necessary
when ship capacity reaches 800,000 DWT. This price rise is
represented on the drawing by a break in the cost curve.


































































































































The second analysis of economies in construction is based
on a cost study conducted by Standard Oil Corporation of New
Jersey. The analysis uses the base case method and therefore
all costs are relative.. The costs are based on 1974 delivery
costs for tankers constructed in Europe and Japan. A 50,000
DWT tanker is the base and is assigned a relative cost per
DWT of one. (See Drawing 7.) The relative cost curve is
plotted in terms of relative tanker investment cost per DWT
on the vertical axis and ship carrying capacity in DWT on
the horizontal axis. As indicated on the drawing, tankers
smaller than 50,000 DWT have a higher per DWT cost and tankers
larger have a relatively lower per DWT cost. A 250,000 DWT
tanker has a relative cost of .54 per DWT and a 400,000 DWT
tanker has a relative cost of .46 per DWT. Although signi-
ficant construction cost economies are demonstrated by this
brief analysis even greated economies may be possible. Costs
for tankers above 250,000 DWT delivered in 1974 were con-
sidered to be excessive due to the unusually high demand and
limited shipyard facilities. [Ref. 19, p. 16]
A study conducted by Soros Associates, is supportive of
the first two analyses. Drawing 8 summarizes the results of
the foreign and U.S. tanker construction cost study. The
slope of the total cost curves for both foreign and U.S.
flag tankers is decreasing which indicates a decreasing total
cost per DWT as ship capacity increases. Soros Associates
also conducted a study of construction costs for dry and
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summarized on Drawings 9 and 10. Again, a decreasing slope
on the total cost curves indicates a decreasing total cost
per DWT as ship capacity increases. [Ref. 20, Part I,
p. II-l]
B. ECONOMIES OF "SUPER" BULK CARRIER TRANSPORTATION
The first analysis of transportation economies available
by "super" bulk carriers is based on information from a study
conducted by Robert R. Nathan Associates and Hydronautics
,
Inc. The study was based predominately on foreign flag ves-
sels and transportation costs were generated via parametric
programming to a general order of magnitude level. Costs
derived do exclude loading, unloading or any other terminal
costs, however, costs for inport time were included. All
costs were based on 1970 dollars and tanker costs were
based upon standard tankers, i.e., they did not have double
bottoms or fully clean ballast systems. Anticiapted Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultive Organization (IMCO) stan-
dards which limit the size of tanks were included. The
following simplifying assumptions were also made: single-
screw propulsion for all ships, 345 day service year, 39.5
hour average port time, 16 knot service speed, 50 percent
load factor (full cargo in one direction and ballast in re-
turn) and 26 men on all vessels thru 200,000 DWT with pro-
gressive increments to a 50 man crew on a 500,000 DWT tanker.
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The annual capital charge was 11.746 percent and was
applied to all estimates of original capital cost. (The
11.746 figure was composed of a 10 percent return on capi-
tal for 20 years which requires a depreciation allowance of
1.746 percent annually based on a sinking fund approach.)
No provision was made for income tax or annual capital
charges. These costs were considered to be transfer pay-
ments and not real economic costs. (Taxes paid by most
foreign flag operators would, most likely, be relatively
small.) [Ref. 3, Vol. V, p. 111-145] Tables XIII and XIV
summarize the results of the Nathan Associates and Hydro-
nautics Inc. parametric computer cost study. Table XIII
is presented on an estimated unit cost per cargo ton basis
for given ship characteristics and various one way voyage
distances. Table XIV was derived from data in Table XIII
and is presented on an estimated unit cost per ton mile
basis for given ship characteristics and various one way
voyage distances. Table XIV is the most beneficial when
analyzing transport cost economies. As indicated on the
table there are three dimensions to the economies. One
economy is realized, for a given voyage distance if tanker
size is increased. A second economy is realized for a given
ship as voyage distance increases, i.e., the transportation
cost per ton mile decreases. A third economy occurs with an
increase in draft for a given DWT and distance.
Tables XV, XVI and XVII summarize a more detailed study
conducted by Nathan Associates. These tables provide a
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Table XIII. Estimated Unit Costs Per Cargo-Ton, by Foreign-





One-way trip distances (nautical miles)











































































































































































































































.454 .760 1,.685 2.468 3.270 4,,905
.454 .760 1,,680 2.460 3.270 4 ,905
.446 .746 1,,655 2.423 3.200 4,,770
.417 .692 1,,530 2.235 2.950 4 ,425






Vessel draft One-way trip distances (nautical miles)
and
d.w.t. 1,000 2,000 5,000 7,500 10,000 15,000
85-foot draft
400,000 .388 .654 1.440 2.108 2.790 4.170
75-foot draft
500,000 .432 .718 1.580 2.318 3.050 4.560
95-foot draft
500,000 .386 .644 1.420 2.078 2.740 4.080
Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwatcr Port
Study
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,








Estimated Unit Shipping Costs Per Ton-Mile, by
Foreign-Flag Vessel Size and Distance
(In 1970 mills)
One-way trip distances (nautical miles)










































.079 .904 .808 .793 .789 .800
.909 .759 .677 .665 .661 .667
.806 .678 .604 .591 .591 .595
.798 .670 .397 .584 .580 .586
.848 .708 .633 .621 .619 .625
.717 .603 .536 .527 .525 .526
.654 .548 .487 .479 .475 .480
.638 .538 .479 .469 .465 .469
.685 .578 .519 .508 .506 .509
.618 .522 .464 .455 .452 .454
.576 .490 .436 .427 .423 .424
.547 .457 .411 .402 .400 .401
.571 .485 .432 .424 .420 .421
.515 .435 .387 .378 .376 .376
.500 .420 .375 .366 .362 .364
.489 .414 .367 .360 .357 .359
.500 .421 .374 .365 .362 .363
.479 .409 .366 .357 .354 .355
.470 .398 .356 .349 .346 .347
.462 .392 .350 .343 .341 .342
.462 .385 .343 .333 .331 .330
.445 .380 .338 .330 .329 .329
.448 .382 .339 .330 .329 .329
.454 .380 .337 .329 .327 .327
.454 .380 .336 .328 .327 .327
.446 .373 . 331 .323 .320 .318
.417 .346 .306 .298 .295 .295






Vessel draft One-way trip distances (nautical miles)
and
d.w.t. 1,000 2,000 5,000 7,500 10,000 15,000
83-foot draft
400,000 .388 .327 .288 .281 .279 .278
75-foot draft
500,000 .432 .359 .316 .309 .305 .304
95-foot draft
500,000 .386 .322 .284 .277 .274 .272
Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwater Port
S tudy
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,




Table XV. Estimated Annual Ocean Shipping Costs for Three
Sizes of Foreign-Flag Tankers, by Cost Category
(In' thousands of 1970 dollars)
Ve s s e 1 d .w . t
.
Cost Component 40,000-/ 120, 000-/ 300,000-/
Investment 739.4 1,286.1 2,409.4
Operating:
Crew 169.0 169.0 221.0
Stores and supplies... 50.6 87.4 169.1
Subsistence 17.9 17.9 23.5
Maintenance, repair... 70.2 104.3 178.3
H$M insurance 78.3 188.2 574.2
P$I insurance 37.6 68.3 141.0
Subtotal 423.6 635.1 1,307.1
Overhead . ... 25.0 25.0 25.0
Total annual cost
excluding fuel 1,188.0 1,946.2 3,741.5
Annual fuel costs,
5,000 mile, 1-way
trips 351.4 729.8 1,583.1
Total annual cost 1,539.4 2,676.0 5,324.6
a/ 35' draft; length, B.P. 650'; breadth, mid. 97'2"; depth,
mid. 47'; SHP , 14,100; speed, 16 knots; crew, 26.
b/ 50' draft; length, B.P. 900'; breadth, mid. 136'; depth,
mid. 65'4"; SHP, 28,100; speed, 16 knots; crew 26.
c/ 71' draft; length, B.P. 1,095'; breadth, mid. 190';
depth, mid. 91'; SHP, 58,000; speed, 16 knots; crew, 34.
Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwater Port
Study
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Institute of Water Resources, 1972, Vol. V, p. 130
64

Table XVI. Estimated Distribution of Annual Ocean Shipping




r . . 40,000 120,000 300,000Cost component (35 , dra£t) (50 , £ra£t) (71 , £ra£t)
Investment 48.0 48.1 45.3
Operating
:












excluding fuel 77.2 72.7 70.3
Annual fuel costs-
5, 000-mile, one-
way trips 22.8 27.3 29.7
Total annual








Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwater Port
Study
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Institute of Water Resources, 1972, Vol. V, p. 131
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Table XVII Estimated Annual Ocean Shipping Costs Per Dead-




















































Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwater Port
Study
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Institute of Water Resources, 1972, Vol. V, p. 132
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detailed breakdown of the various cost components for three
different size tankers. (40,000; 120,000; and 300,000 DWT
.
)
A one-way voyage distance of 5,000 nautical miles was used
in computing transportation costs. All previously noted
assumptions for the first Nathan Associates study are ap-
plicable. Table XV provides an estimated annual component
and total shipping cost for the three foreign flag tankers.
Table XVI was derived from data- in Table XV, however, total
annual component shipping costs are expressed as a per-
centage of the total annual shipping cost for the various
size tankers. It should be noted insurance costs for both
hull and machinery (H§M) and protection and indemnity (P^I)
and fuel costs increase as a percentage of total cost as
tanker size increases. All other costs tend to be a lower
percentage of the total cost as tanker size increases.
Table XVI is the most useful for analyzing the various cost
components per thousand DWT as tanker size increases. When
expressed in terms of cost per thousand DWT all cost com-
ponents decrease as tanker size increases. This table re-
veals that nearly half the difference in total annual cost
per DWT between a 40,000 and 120,000 DWT tanker is due to
construction cost economies. Another third of the difference
is due to the larger tankers lower crew and fuel costs. In
analyzing the difference between a 120,000 and 300,000 DWT
tanker, the cost differences are much less significant,
however, the same three component costs are still the pri-
mary economies as tanker size increases.
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The second analysis of transportation economies avail-
able via progressively larger "super" bulk carriers is based
on a study conducted by IHI of Japan. The summary of this
study is shown on Drawing 11. No cost information was made
available by IHI, most likely, for proprietary reasons.
The drawing indicates that transportation costs per tanker
DOT gradually decrease as tanker size increases up to ap-
proximately 800,000 DWT . The incremental cost change be-
tween 600,000 and 800,000 DWT is relatively minor in
comparison to the change between 200,000 and 400,000 DWT.
As noted earlier, due to technical considerations, IHI
recommends shifting to a twin propeller means of propulsion
when ship size reaches 800,000 DWT. As shown on the draw-
ing, the cost curve has a break and moves significantly
higher above 800,000 DWT. The per unit transportation cost
for a 800,000 DWT tanker with twin propellers appears to be
very comparable to a 400,000 DWT tanker with single pro-
peller propulsion. For this reason IHI does not believe it
will be economically practical with present technology to
build a tanker above 800,000 DWT. [Ref. 16, p. 28]
The third analysis of transportation economies avail-
able via progressively larger "super" bulk carriers is based
on the Standard Oil of New Jersey study referenced to pre-
viously. This analysis used the base case method of a
50,000 DWT carrier. A relative transportation cost of 1001
is assigned. (See Drawing 12.) The transportation cost


































































































































Drawing 12 Relative Transportation Cost Analysis, Persian
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one unit of petroleum from the Persian Gulf around the Cape
to the east coast of the United States. The transportation
cost includes costs for both legs of the voyage, operating
costs (wages, repairs, insurance, port charges, and bulker
fuel costs), and capital recovery costs. Recovery costs are
keyed to the initial investment costs indicated on Drawing
7. A nominal discounted cash flow of 101 return on total
capital for a 20 year period was used as the basis for de-
termining capital recovery costs.
As indicated on the drawing the relative transportation
cost per unit decreases as tanker capacity in DWT increases.
The relative transportation cost per unit for the 350,000
DWT tanker is less than half the transportation cost of the
50,000 DWT tanker. (The figure is actually 481.) Drawing
13 indicates the additional per unit increase in the trans-
portation costs if capital recovery costs for a terminal and
associated distribution pipeline system were installed to
receive fuel from the 350,000 and 250,000 DWT tanker. A
capital recovery cost of 6.5 cents per barrel for the ter-
minal and 5.5 cents per barrel for the pipeline system is
included. These figures were derived from an industrial
study to install a terminal inside Delaware Bay. A daily
throughput of 1.7 million barrels was assumed. As indi-
cated on the drawing the relative transportation cost per
unit for the 350,000 DWT tanker is approximately 60% of
the cost for the 50,000 DWT tanker.
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Drawing 13 Relative Transportation Cost Analysis, Persian
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Drawing 14 carries the previous analysis one step fur-
ther. All previously discussed assumptions apply, with the
exception that the Suez Canal is now assumed to be open.
Both the 50,000 and the 74,000 DWT tankers may now transit
the Suez Canal on each leg of the voyage. The 250,000 and
the 350,000 DWT tankers must still transit around the Cape
but will transit the Suez on the ballast leg back to the
Persian Gulf. The appropriate toll charges have been added
to the relative transportation costs. As indicated on
the drawing, all relative transportation costs are now re-
duced, however the 350,000 DWT tanker still provides the
least cost means of transporting the unit of oil.
C. ECONOMIES OF DRY AND MULTI-PURPOSE "SUPER" BULK CARRIERS
The previous two sections have dealt primarily with the
construction and transportation economies available via
progressively larger "super" bulk tankers. However, the
Soros Associates study of construction cost economies avail-
able via larger dry and multi-purpose bulk carriers was
briefly summarized in the first section. Nathan Associates
did not conduct a separate computer parametric transporta-
tion cost study for either dry or multi-purpose bulk carriers
A study of these two types of bulk carriers revealed that
cost differences were "very modest" and the basic design
"The canal tolls are based on the pre-closure levels
escalated at the rate of \% per year. This rate is based
on the 1957 agreement the Egyptian Government made with the













































































































































































and operating features of all bulk carriers were generally
similar. The major differences discovered were the inter-
nal arrangements and design of the cargo holds. The cost
to construct either a dry or a multi-purpose bulk carrier
was found to be relatively higher than a comparable size
tanker. (See Table XVIII.) Although the cost to operate
and maintain a multi-purpose bulk carrier was found to be
higher than either a tanker or dry bulk carrier, the trans-
portation cost for the multi-purpose bulk carrier was found
to be less. This is due to the higher load factor avail-
able with multi-purpose bulk carriers. Tankers and dry
bulk carriers typically have a load factor of 501, however,
it is not uncommon for a multi-purpose bulk carrier to have
a load factor above 601. [Ref. 3, Vol. V, p. 145]
The additional flexibility and utilization available via
the multi-purpose bulk carriers has enabled this type of
vessel to serve multiple markets. As indicated earlier by
the number of multi-purpose bulk carriers on order and under
construction this type vessel is becoming progressively more
popular. Due to the volatile nature of the bulk shipping
business bulk rates fluctuate as demand for various bulk
commodities changes. Multi-purpose bulk carriers allow
maximum flexibility to enter the most profitable markets.
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Table XVIII. Investment Cost Relationships of Tankers, Dry




Dry bulk carrier. . .
.























Source: Robert R. Nathan Associates, U.S. Deepwater
Port Study
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Institute of Water Resources, 1972,
Vol. V, p. 14 7.
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VII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE TO PROVIDE UNITED STATES
FACILITIES TO ACCOMMODATE "SUPER" BULK CARRIERS
A. HIGHER COST OF IMPORTED BULK MINERAL RESOURCES
As noted previously, the United States is progressively
becoming more dependent on foreign countries for the most
economical sources of many fuel and non-fuel mineral re-
sources. Not only has reliance on these resources been in-
creasing but the geographic origin has also been shifting
toward more remote regions. It appears inevitable, at
least in the near future, that the volume of these imported
minerals will continue to increase and shipping distances
will generally become longer
The technology of the "super" bulk carrier is available
to significantly reduce the transportation costs required
to ship these commodities. For example, the unit cost per
long ton for a 5,000 mile one-way voyage for a 30,000 DWT
vessel is approximately $4.00, for a 200,000 DWT vessel
$1.70, and for a 500,000 DWT vessel $1.50. Thus a 57.5
percent decrease is possible by using a 200,000 DWT vessel
and a 62.5 percent decrease is available by using a 500,000
DWT vessel. [Ref. 3, Vol. I, p. 10] There appears to be
no other technology presently available that can provide
both the efficiency and flexibility required to transport
huge volumes of bulk commodities over long distances.
Basic industry in the United States is the primary con-
sumer of imported mineral resources. At the present time
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no U.S. industry is capable of fully capitalizing on trans-
portation economies available via "super" bulk carriers.
The U.S. petroleum industry has, to a limited extent, ben-
efited by using "super"_ tankers to transfer petroleum to
smaller tankers or by offloading at foreign transhipment
ports located in Canada and the Bahamas. However, the ad-
ditional cost involved in transferring or transhipping
significantly reduce the benefits that would be available
if the U.S. could accommodate "super" tankers. In a re-
cent study conducted by Robert R. Nathan Associates pe-
troleum imports to the United States in 1980 were projected
to reach approximately 6.9 MM B/D. This forecast is quite
conservative, based upon the National Petroleum Council's
Case III which projected imports in 1980 to reach 10.3 MM
B/D. Case III is generally believed to be the most accu-
rate forecast presently available. However, based on the
6.9 MM B/D figure Nathan Associates predicted that approxi-
mately $600 million dollars could be saved annually in re-
duced transportation costs for petroleum if the United States
would provide suitable offloading facilities for "super"
tankers. Studies conducted by the Maritime Administration,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Soros Associates also ar-
rived at very similar figures.
The cost savings was in comparison to the costs that
would be charged if the maximum size tankers were used at
the existing ports without further deepening. All costs
and savings arc in 1970 dollars. [Ref. 3, Vol. I, p. 10]
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To the extent that additional transportation costs are
reflected in the delivered cost of imported resources, con-
sumer prices could be expected to rise. Other possibilities
are, American consumers would purchase less expensive im-
ported finished goods or the additional costs would be borne
by U.S. industry. The market conditions at the time would
determine which one or combination of these possibilities
would occur.
B. LOSS OF COMPETITIVENESS IN OVERSEAS EXPORT MARKETS
The United States economy depends to a large extent on
exports of both finished goods and bulk commodities such as
grain, metallurgical coal and phosphate rock. Exported
goods have in recent years been accounting for a greater
share of the United States gross national product. In order
to maintain a competitive position in the foreign market
place, U.S. industry has generally incorporated the most
efficient production technology. If Japanese and European
exporters of finished products can attain an additional
margin of efficiency not available to U.S. industry, our
competitive position will surely suffer.
U.S. industries which depend on foreign imports of fuel
and non-fuel mineral resources do not in general enjoy the
margin of efficiency available to similar industries in
foreign countries that do have deepwater port facilities.
For example, Japan can import both iron ore and coking
coal, produce finished steel and ship it to the United
States, and compete very favorably in the U.S. market for.
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finished steel. A primary reason for the success of Jap-
anese industry has been their utilization of the most effi-
cient technology available. One such technology is the
"super" bulk carrier.
The United States is a major exporter of bituminous
coal, phosphate rock and grains. These commodities account
for the highest tonnage of exports from the United States.
The delivered costs of these commodities presently reflect
the relatively inefficient means by which they are trans-
ported. The ocean transport savings that could be realized
by more efficient shipping could accrue to the U.S. expor-
ter in the form of higher profit margins, lowered delivered
costs or a combination of both. The foreign market for
U.S. exported bulk commodities is generally competitive.
To the extent that the delivered cost of U.S. exported
bulk commodities is higher than other sources the competi-
tive position of U.S. exporters of bulk commodities will
suffer.
C. RELOCATION OF U.S. INDUSTRIES
The inability of United States' ports to accept deep-
draft "super" bulk carriers and the resultant higher trans-
portation costs introduces the risk of relocation or closing
down of U.S. processing industries. U.S. industry may incur
significant competitive disadvantages which could in the long
run encourage these industries to seek more favorable loca-




The newly independent country of the Bahamas has de-
veloped one deepwater port and is in the process of devel-
oping a second. Both will be capable of handling 500,000
DWT tankers. The Bahamas are also expanding their refining
facilities and are exporting finished and semi- finished
petroleum products to the east coast of the United States.
The new government is encouraging foreign investment in in-
dustry on a partnership basis with either Bahamians or the
Government. Shortly after receiving independence, Prime
Minister Pindling's government issued a White Paper on In-
dependence. The Paper indicates that Bahamas' tax-haven
status will be maintained and that nationalization will
not be an instrument of government economic policy. [Ref.
21, p. 40]
Gulf Oil Company has recently completed a deep-draft
tanker and refining complex at Port Tupper, Novia Scotia
and is exporting finished and semi- finished petroleum to
the east coast of the United States. [Ref. 22, p. 4] The
Premier of Nova Scotia, The Honorable G. A. Regan, recently
addressed a Seatrade Conference and noted that by expanding
refineries in Nova Scotia the United States petroleum in-
dustry could solve two major problems. A location which
provided facilities to accommodate "super" tankers and a
site for new refineries. Mr. Reagan further stated,
"It is impossible to operate an oil oriented deepwater
port without running the risk that some day a spill
could occur resulting in serious pollution problems.
It is unlikely that provincial governments would be
prepared to accept that risk for the minimal economic
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activity generated by pure transhipment. The more
probable conclusion is that government in any pro-
vincial jurisdiction would want to extract at least
refining employment in the return for the use of such
unique facilities as our deepwater harbours provide."
[Ref. 23, p. 458]
The Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico
is developing a deepwater port facility offshore Mona
Island and is encouraging U.S. petroleum industries to
construct a refining and petro-chemical complex on the
island. The Wall Street Journal has recently been carry-
ing advertisements quoting Governor Hernandez-Colon,
"Open a plant that provides work for our people and we'll
guarantee you no taxes, federal or local."
It is clear that many of this countries ' neighbors will
readily provide deepwater port facilities, refinery and
petro-chemical sites, and tax incentives to U.S. petroleum
industries. These offers must sound fairly enticing to
industries located in states such as Delaware where ex-
pansion is discouraged, deepwater port facilities are not
available and, in addition, industries must pay for the
installation for expensive pollution control devices.
U.S. based multi-national corporations have no moral
commitment to expand in or even to retain plants in the
United States. They are presently being penalized in a
number of ways, one of which is being forced to use a
relatively inefficient mode of transportation, i.e., small
bulk carriers. The incentives to relocate are present.
Although the petroleum and petro-chemical industries have

been the main subject of this discussion advanced process-
ing of iron ore and bauxite at foreign mines is also taking
place. Processing of these ores closer to the source re-
duces the transportation cost. These processes had, until
recently, generally taken place in the United States.
D. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
The relocation of industry outside the United States
may result in a massive outflow of U.S. capital. A similar
situation may occur if the United States continues to de-
pend on progressively larger volumes of foreign mineral
resources which are transported in relatively small foreign
bulk carriers. A loss of U.S. industries' competitive
position would also have detrimental effects on the balance
of payments and, therefore, on the value of the U.S. dol-
lar. As noted previously this is a possibility if U.S.
industry is not provided the opportunity to utilize the
most efficient means of transporting large volumes of
bulk commodities, i.e., the "super" bulk carrier.
E. PORT CONGESTION AND POLLUTION
As previously noted the U.S. will, most likely, depend
on greater volumes of imported bulk mineral resources in
the future. If facilities are not provided to accommodate
larger bulk carriers then a greater volume of small bulk
carriers will be required or less trade will take place.
U.S. port facilities will require massive expansion to
accommodate the higher volume of small bulk carrier traffic.
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With a higher volume of traffic there is also a higher risk
of both collisions and grounding which in the case of tankers
would mean more oil spills.
The Council on Environmental Quality has recently spon-
sored a study on oil spills. The Chairman of the Council
12
recently testified in a Congressional hearing,
"Based on studies conducted for the Council by the U.S.
Coast Guard, it appears that creating superports in the
United States carries less risk of oil spill damage
than does the transhipping and oil from foreign ports.
For example, over a 20 year period, at an import level
of 2 million barrels per day, we can statistically
project approximately 37 vessel casualties resulting
in spillage of over 29,000 tons of oil assuming small
tankers averaging 50,000 DWT are used to tranship oil
from Canadian and Caribbean terminals to conventional
U.S. ports. On the other hand, if the same oil were
transported direct to U.S. offshore terminals in super-
tankers averaging 250,000 DWT we can project about
four casualties totaling 2,500 tons of oil spilled."
[Ref. 24, p. 142]
If 30,000 DWT tankers were used to deliver 3 MM B/D to
the U.S. 13 port arrivals per day would be required. Ar-
rivals drop to eight per day if 50,000 DWT tankers are used,
one and a half per day if 250,000 DWT tankers are used and
to three quarters of an arrival per day if 500,000 DWT
tankers are used. Historical data analyzed by the Coast
Guard on collisions and groundings demonstrate that most
oil spill accidents occur when harbor congestion is great
and where maneuvering ships are restricted by narrow wind-
ing channels. [Ref. 25, p. 384]




VIII. RECENT EVENTS PERTAINING TO DEEPWATER PORT AND TERMINAL
DEVELOPMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
A. MAJOR DEEPWATER PORT AND TERMINAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Since 1970 various federal, state, and private agencies
have conducted or sponsored numerous studies associated with
deepwater port and terminal development by the United States.
Pertinent economic, engineering and environmental factors
have been analyzed in detail. The federal agencies that
have sponsored and/or conducted major studies are: U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Maritime Administration, U.S. Coast
Guard, Council on Environmental Quality, and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) . Although
these agencies were directly involved in studies, they also
contracted and awarded grants to conduct studies. Major
contracts were awarded to management and engineering con-
sulting agencies such as Robert R. Nathan Associates, Soros
Associates, and Arthur D. Little, Inc. Grants to study
environmental considerations were awarded via the Sea Grant
program to the following universities: University of Dela-
ware, Louisiana State University, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, State University of New York at Stony Brook,
and the University of Maryland.
The states of Delaware, Texas, Maine, Alabama, and
Louisiana are among those that have sponsored deepwater port
associated studies. The Delaware Bay Transportation Company,
Seadock, and the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) are
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among the oil and pipeline consortiums that have also spon-
sored deepwater port studies. In some instances individual
oil and pipeline companies have undertaken major studies.
No attempt will be made to individually summarize all
the pertinent studies. A partial list of the major studies
has been compiled and included in Appendix A. Although all
studies do not agree as to the various economic, engineer-
ing and environmental factors there is considerable agree-
ment
.
It is generally agreed that the alternative of dredging
existing channels and ports is unsatisfactory from an econ-
omic, engineering and environmental point of view. The
dredging of existing channels to a depth of approximately
75 feet to accommodate 250,000 DWT bulk carriers would un-
dermine many existing structures such as piers, terminals,
and bridge supports. Tunnels and underwater pipelines would
also require relocation. On the east and Gulf coast rock
and/or the continential shelf pose major obstacles to
dredging. Channel maintenance and disposal of dredged ma-
terial would also be very costly. Dredging would also in-
crease the cross sectional area of the existing channels
and would introduce a larger volume of salt water into
estuaries to the detriment of brackish-water species such
as the oyster. Dredging would also jeopardize urban water
sources if the acquifer strata was penetrated. In general,
alternatives which required no dredging were preferred.
However, Robert R. Nathan Associates did consider dredging
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at Hampton Roads to be economically justified. Soros As-
sociates also proposed limited dredging but only near the
mouth of major bays or offshore. Even if the dredging of
major channels could be justified the turning and handling
of large vessels within the existing port and channel con-
fines would be very hazardous.
Transhipment of bulk commodities from foreign locations
via small bulk carriers was also considered as an alterna-
tive. This is presently being done with petroleum from
ports in the Bahamas and Canada. Other petroleum tranship-
ment ports are being constructed at locations such as Jamaica
and Curaco. Transhipping of oil via foreign ports can be
economically justified in some cases. Transhipping oil
from an offshore platform via small tankers can also be
economically justified based on the present throughput of
oil on the east coast and projected throughput on the Gulf
and west coast. The transhipment of dry bulk commodities,
however, cannot be economically justified from either an
offshore platform or via a foreign port. Transhipment of
dry bulk commodities was analyzed on both the Gulf and east
coast, however, due to relatively low throughput, shorter
shipping distances, and high transhipment costs this al-
ternative was judged to be uneconomical. Soros Associates
could only justify the construction of an offshore platform




Even though petroleum transhipment can be economically
justified, there are environmental hazards. As previously
noted, the volume of imported petroleum is predicted to
significantly increase in the future. Petroleum tranship-
ment from either an offshore platform or a foreign port
will require the use of small tankers, approximately 65,000
DWT
. To handle the increased volume of petroleum a large
fleet of small tankers will be required. The increased
traffic in already congested shipping lanes and ports will
undoubtedly lead to an increased number of groundings,
collisions, and oil spills. For this reason transhipment
via a fleet of small tankers has been judged to be an in-
ferior alternative.
The practice of lightening "super" tankers to small
tankers or barges was also considered as an alternative.
Lightening is only possible in protected harbors or in calm
seas, however, this practice is being used on all three
coasts. There have recently been strong protests against
lightening in protected harbors. Since lightening is a
form of transhipment and does not solve the problem of
congestion in shipping lanes, ports and channels it was
considered to be an inferior alternative.
Offshore deepwater port development with a submerged
pipeline to shore was considered to be the best alternative
from both an economic and environmental viewpoint. Off-
shore development was found to be economically justified
on the east coast based on the present throughput of petroleum
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and on the Gulf and west coast based on projected throughput,
Various designs for fixed platforms, single point mooring
buoys, and storage islands were analyzed. All proved to be
financially attractive.
.
In general, the single point moor-
ing buoy was found to be the least expensive alternative.
The most expensive alternative, but also the best design
from an environmental point of view, was that of Soros
Associates. (See Drawings 15, 16, and 17.)
The U.S. Coast Guard conducted an analysis of casualty
oil spills for the Council on Environmental Quality. The
study revealed that the number of polluting tanker casu-
alties and the total oil spilled would be less from "super"
tankers averaging 250,000 DWT serving offshore deepwater
ports than from tankers averaging 50,000 DWT serving con-
i 4-13ventional ports.
NOAA awarded grants to five universities to analyze the
environmental effects of oil spills, construction, and opera-
tions from port development at a number of locations on the
east and Gulf coasts. The studies revealed the vulnera-
bility to environmental damage from deepwater port develop-
ment was likely to be the greatest at inshore locations,
particularly those involving massive dredging, and less at
offshore locations. Estuaries and coastal wetlands were
found to be the most biologically productive and also the
Key assumptions - the same amount of oil was trans










































































































































































































most sensitive to oil spill effects. There was a general
consensus that if tankers transited close to the coast and
in restricted waters there was a higher probability of un-
avoidable ecological and recreational damage from oil
spill effects. At offshore locations it was concluded
that construction effects were minimized and the probability
of an oil spill reaching sensitive estuarine areas was
greatly reduced.
The environmental effects of deepwater port development
are not limited to the marine environment since industrial
expansion onshore would, most likely, result. The environ-
mental effects from industrial activity onshore if not
properly controlled could prove to be a greater detriment
to the environment than the construction and operation of
an offshore oil port. Studies undertaken indicate the con-
struction of only one deepwater port on each coast would
tend to maximize the transportation savings but would likely
result in the highest social and environmental costs. These
costs would be highest in areas which are already densely
populated, heavily industrialized, stressed by pollution,
or used as recreational areas. Land use decisions will be
of primary importance in determining the location of deep-
water port development. Locations should be selected where
regional economic benefits are needed and where associated
environmental impacts might be better tolerated.
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B. LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE FOR LICENSING OF DEEPWATER PORT
AND TERMINAL DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION
At the present time there is no authorizing legislation
which would permit the construction of an offshore deepwater
port beyond the three mile limit. States have primary ju-
risdiction over the area from their shorelines out to the
three mile limit. The states of California and New York
have authorized the installation of a limited number of off-
shore terminals, however, the largest of these facilities
are limited to serving tankers up to 130,000 DWT . There
are approximately six bills before Congress to provide for
the construction and operation of deepwater ports beyond
the three mile limit. The major disagreements are on issues
of environmental protection, state control, and federal
agency responsibility for control of deepwater port facil-
ities. The administration backed bills are HR 7501 and
S 1751. These bills would permit the Secretary of the
Interior to issue licenses for the construction and opera-
tion of offshore deepwater ports beyond the three mile
limit. The Secretary would be required to consult with the
governors of offshore states to insure that the operation
of the facility and related land based activities were
consistent with the state land use program.
C. DEEPWATER PORT AND TERMINAL DEVELOPMENT
1 . East Coast of the United States
Numerous attempts have been made by individual or
consortiums of oil and pipeline companies to develop deepwater
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ports and terminals for crude oil on the east coast. Two
of the first proposed were the Machiasport Oil Refinery
and the Delaware Bay Transportation Company projects. Both
were initially proposed. in the late 'sixties and early
'seventies. Since construction was within the three mile
limit the states of Maine and Delaware could have authorized
development after the proposals met various federal agency
requirements. Maine's Environmental Improvement Commission
recommended rejecting the Machiasport project and the pas-
sage of the Delaware Coastal Zone Act of 1971 prohibited the
construction of any offshore deepwater port or terminal.
Delaware's Coastal Zone Act has recently come under heavy
criticism by the building trades, Delaware Chamber of Com-
merce, DuPont Co., the 13 companies that make up the Dela-
ware Bay Transportation Company, and even from the state
appointed Delaware Bay Oil Transport Committee.
Additional proposals for deepwater port development
have been submitted by the Bayside Pipeline Co. and the
Intercontinental Pipeline Co. The Bayside facility would
permit unloading of "super" tankers near the mouth of
Delaware Bay. Oil' would then be piped to refineries on the
Delaware River and the Arthur Kill areas. The pipeline
would be located on the New Jersey side of Delaware Bay.
The Intercontinental Pipeline Co. proposal is for the con-
struction of a facility 36 miles south of Cape May. The
submerged pipeline would come ashore in New Jersey and oil
would be piped to refineries in the Philadelphia and New
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York area. At present neither of these facilities can go
beyond the planning and design stage since both would be
located beyond the three mile limit.
Another recently proposed deepwater port facility
was rejected by the town of Durham and the state of New
Hampshire. Olympic Refineries, Inc., an Onassis' firm,
had proposed construction of a $600 million oil refinery
and deepwater port. Even with strong backing from the
Governor, the town and the state legislature both rejected
the proposal. The Coastal Plains Regional Commission
(states of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia) have
recently joined with seven major oil companies to conduct
an economic and environmental feasibility study for the
construction of an offshore deepwater port in that region.
Although the east coast of the United States, and
in particular the northeastern region, has the highest
economic need for deepwater facilities. There has been
no significant progress due to strong environmental op-
position. Environmentalists are concerned not only with
the marine environment but also the onshore environment
since industrial development would, most likely, accompany
deepwater port development.
2 . Gulf Coast of the United States
Numerous Gulf coast states have encouraged oil and
pipeline consortiums to construct offshore deepwater ports
and terminals. At the present time three major facilities
are in the planning stage. In Louisiana, a consortium of
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13 oil and pipeline companies known as LOOP, Inc. (Louisiana
Offshore Oil Platform) has completed extensive economic,
engineering, and environmental studies. Final design and a
more detailed environmental study are presently being con-
ducted. The initial facility would be located approximately
21 miles offshore of LaFourche Parish, La. It would con-
sist of three single point mooring buoys, pumping platforms,
and two pipelines (48 inches by 56 inches) 21 miles long.
The onshore facility would consist of a storage facility
and pipeline from LaFourche Parish to the St. James, La.
terminal of Capline. In a later stage of development two
additional buoys and three submerged pipelines would be
added. Upon completion of the last stage the facility
would be capable of receiving approximately 4 MM B/D. Re-
fineries in eastern Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, Ten-
nessee, Missouri, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and
Michigan would be supplied via the LOOP and Capline facil-
ity. Cost estimates are (in 1972 dollars) $150 million
for the offshore facility and submerged pipelines. One
hundred thirty million dollars for the storage facility
located onshore, and $88 million for the pipeline to con-
nect the storage facility to Capline. [Ref. 26, p. 299-
375]
In Texas, 11 oil companies and one petro-chemical
company have formed a consortium known as Seadock. The
Seadock facility is very similar to LOOP. Seadock's fa-
cility would consist of three single point mooring buoys
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located 25 to 30 miles off the coast of Freeport, Texas.
Submerged pipelines and an onshore oil storage and pipeline
network would also be constructed. The facility would sup-
ply crude petroleum to refineries in western Louisiana,
Texas, and possibly the midwest. The Seadock facility
would be capable of receiving approximately 3 MM B/D. The
total Seadock initial investment has been estimated to be
approximately $545 million.
The states of Alabama and Mississippi have formed
an organization known as Ameraport Corporation. Ameraport
has sponsored both environmental and economic studies per-
taining to deepwater port development at a location approxi-
mately 26 miles offshore the Mobile-Pascagoula area.
Ameraport has been actively publicizing the benefits of
developing an offshore deepwater port, oil refineries, and
petro-chemical plants in the states of Alabama and Missis-
sippi. However, to date the Ameraport project has met with
very limited success.
The ports of Galveston and Corpus Christi have re-
cently initiated a campaign to gain approval for massive
dredging operations to provide for land based deepwater
port facilities. Studies conducted by these ports indicate
the economic benefits of providing facilities for both
liquid and dry bulk commodities are greater than the cost
14
of dredging operations which would be required.
These studies have not been reviewed by the author




Olympic Refineries, Inc. are still looking for a
location to build a $600 million refinery and a deepwater
port. Although this Onassis' project was recently rejected
in the state of New Hampshire, the states along the Gulf
coast have been proposed as possible locations. As of this
writing, Olympic Refineries has not yet made a firm pro-
posal. The states of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama are under active consideration.
3. West Coast of the United States
As previously noted, there are approximately 19 off-
shore oil terminals along the coast of California, however,
none of these facilities is considered to be a deepwater
facility since the largest tanker that can presently be ac-
commodated is 130,000 DWT . There is at present only one
major deepwater facility proposal for the west coast. The
Standard Oil Company of California has recently completed
a six-month site and geographical evaluation at a proposed
location offshore Estero Bay. The location is within the
three mile limit and would consist of a single point moor-
ing buoy and a submerged pipeline. Oil would be pumped
ashore to storage tanks and then to Standard's Richmond Bay
refinery. The facility would accommodate tankers up to
approximately 400,000 DWT and would be capable of receiving




The United States is becoming a "have not" nation for
the most economical source of many fuel and non-fuel min-
eral resources required by U.S. industry. The three bulk
resources which will, most likely, by required in the largest
volume are crude petroleum, iron ore, and alumina/bauxite.
The trend toward greater dependence on foreign sources for
these and many other resources is certain to increase in the
future. There is a general trend in the geographic origin
of many of these imported resources toward more remote re-
gions and thus, shipping distances are increasing. The most
economical means of transporting large volumes of these and
other bulk commodities is via "super" bulk carriers.
Since the early 'sixties the capacity of ocean bulk car-
riers has been steadily increasing. "Super" tankers with a
capacity of 477,000 DWT (3.5 million barrels) are presently
in service and a 706,000 DWT "super" tanker is under construc-
tion contract. The capacity of both dry and multi-purpose
bulk carriers has also been steadily increasing. The largest
of these ships is 280,000 DWT and carriers as large as 400,000
DWT are expected in the near future.
With a few exceptions ports in the United States can
only accommodate vessels with a capacity between 65,000
and SO, 000 DWT. Recent deepwater port studies indicate
the best alternative for providing facilities for "super"
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tankers is via offshore deepwater development. This alter-
native was found to be the most preferable from both econ-
omic and environmental viewpoints. Offshore deepwater port
development for receipt of crude petroleum was found to be
economically justified based on the present throughput of
oceanborne petroleum on the east coast and projected ocean-
borne petroleum throughput on the Gulf and west coast.
Deepwater port studies indicate the construction of
offshore deepwater port facilities for the receipt and ship-
ment of dry bulk commodities is not economically justified.
Dry bulk commodities require transhipment and a large off-
shore storage and transhipment platform would be necessary.
Slurry technology may be an alternative to constructing such
a facility, thus no transhipment would be required. Slurry
technology is being used by the Marcona Corp. to ship iron
sands concentrates from New Zealand's North Island to Japan.
The slurry can be loaded and offloaded via a single point
mooring buoy, however, Marcona is only using this method to
onload at present. Slurry technology is also been success-
fully used to transport coal via pipeline. The Maritime
Administration has recently sponsored research for slurry-
ing of coal, iron ore, bauxite/alumina and phosphate.
Slurry technology, if found to be suitable for these com-
modities, may significantly lower the initial investment
and operation costs so that offshore deepwater port develop-
ment for dry bulk commodities may also be justified. Fur-
ther research is required.
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Private industry in the United States has not been suc-
cessful in their numerous attempts to develop suitable off-
shore deepwater facilities to receive crude petroleum from
"super" tankers. Private proposals on the east coast have
been rejected for environmental reasons, however, this
coast has the highest industrial need for such facilities.
Gulf coast states have encouraged private offshore deep-
water port facilities for the receipt of petroleum. Due
to "institutional drag" and the lack of authorizing legis-
lation all proposals are at a standstill. There has been
only one deepwater facility proposed on the west coast and
this facility would be located within the three mile limit.
Numerous public and private agencies have conducted
studies which examine the need for deepwater ports and al-
ternative solutions to deepwater port problems and require-
ments. Although most studies have considered the environmental
impacts and social implications of deepwater port development
none have succeeded in quantifying environmental and social
costs. The total economic costs and benefits have not been
identified due to the present limitations in techniques of
economic analysis. These social and environmental costs
may, however, be reduced by judicious land use planning and
pollution control technology. One solution would be to
locate deepwater terminals for receipt of crude petroleum
and new refining capacity in regions where industrial ben-
efits are desired and where the associated environmental and
social costs could be reduced and tolerated. Construction
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of deepwater terminals to service existing refineries, which
have a high throughput of oceanborne crude petroleum, ap-
pears to be the best solution from both an economic and en-
vironmental point of view.
A failure to provide United States facilities to accom-
modate "super" tankers and, when economically justified,
"super" dry and multi-purpose bulk carriers will have far
reaching effects on U.S. industry, the cost of living, bal-
ance of payments and the environment. Compelling evidence
is at hand which implies, if the United States is to main-
tain its status as a leading economic power the technolog-
ical efficiency of "super" bulk carriers should be utilized.
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APPENDIX A: LISTING OF MAJOR DEEPWATER PORT AND TERMINAL
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
I. ECONOMIC, ENGINEERING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
Arthur D. Little, Inc., Foreign Deepwater Port Develop -
ments-A Selective Overview of Economics, Engineering
and Environmental Factors^ prepared for U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources,
December 1971, (IWR-Report 71-11)
Vol. I. - Summary
Vol. II. - Appendix A - France, Dunkirk and Leharve
Appendix B - Belgium, Antwerp
Appendix C - The Netherlands, Rotterdam
and Amsterdam
Vol. III. - Appendix D - United Kingdom
Appendix E - Canada, Port Carter
Appendix F - Australia
Appendix G - Japan
Appendix H - The Persian Gulf
Appendix I - Bantry Bay, Ireland
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., U.S. Deepwater Port
Study prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Institute for Water Resources, August 1972. (IWR
Report 72-8)
Vol. I. - Summary Report
Vol. II. - Commodity Studies and Projections
Vol. III. - Physical Coast and Port Characteristics,
and Selected Deepwater Port Alternatives
Vol. IV. - The Environmental and Ecological Aspects
of Deepwater Ports
Vol. V. - Transport of Bulk Commodities and Bene-
fit-Cost Relationships
Soros Associates, Inc. Offshore Terminal System Concepts
,
prepared for U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime
Administration, September 1972.
Part 1 - Evaluation of Requirements and Capabili-
ties for Determination of the Need for
Offshore Terminals
Part 2 - Connections Between Deep-Draft Terminals
and Existing Facilities by Utilization
of Feeder Vessels, Pipelines and/or
Shore Facilities Relocation
Part 3 - Formulation of Advanced Concepts for
Offshore Terminals
Part 4 - Executive Summary
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U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
The Economics of Deepwater Terminals , Government
Printing Office, 1972
II. ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
Arthur D. Little, Inc. Potential Onshore Effects of
Deepwater Oil Terminals Related Industrial Develop -
ment
,
prepared for Council on Environmental Quality,
September 1973.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
Center for Wetland Resources Louisiana State Univer-
sity, Louisiana Superport Studies, Report No . 1 -
Preliminary Recommendations and Data Analysis
,
prepared for National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration, August 1972.
Center for Wetland Resources, Louisiana State Univer-
sity, Louisiana Superport Studies, Report No. 2 -
Preliminary Assessment of the Enviornmental Impact
of a Superport on the Southern Coastal Area of
Louisiana
,
prepared for National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration, 1972.
McHugh,
and Operation of a Supertanker Terminal on the
Marine Environment in New York Bight
,
State Univer-
sity of New York, Stony Brook, Marine Sciences Re-
search Center, prepared for Council on Environmental
Quality, November 1972.
Don Maurer, et al , Environmental Vulnerability of the
Delaware Bay Area to Super Tanker Accommodation
,
University of Delaware , College of Marine Studies
,
prepared for Council on Environmental Quality,
February 1973.
Vol . I - Summary
Vol. II - Biology, Volume
Vol. Ill - Chemistry, Engineering, Geology, Physical
Oceanography
Vol. IV - Biology Appendix
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Stephen F. Moore, Robert L. Dwyer and Arthur M. Katz,
A Preliminary Assessment of the Environmental Vul -
nerability of Machias Bay, Maine to Oil Supertankers
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, prepared for
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
January 1973.
George A. Rounsefell, Ecological Effects of Offshore
Construction
,
University of Alabama, Marine Science
Institute, prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Coastal Research Center, 1972.
Wesley P. James, et al , Environmental Aspects of a
Supertanker Port on the Texas Gulf Coast
,
Texas A§M
University, prepared for National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration, December 1972.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS DEEPWATER PORT DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATED
STUDIES
Steward Borland and Martha Oliver, Port Expansion in
the Puget Sound Region 1970-2000
,
University of
Washington , Division of Marine Resources, prepared
for National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, October 1972.
Danial M. Bragg, et al , Work Plan for a Study of the
Feasibility of an Offshore Terminal in the Texas
Gulf Coast
,
Texas A§M Univeristy, June 1971.
Danial M. Bragg and James R. Bradley, The Economic
Impact of a Deepwater Terminal in Texas
,
Texas
A§M University, prepared for National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, November 1972.
Joseph I. Carroll, et al , Planning for Coastal Ports
on a Systems Basis: Preliminary Methodological
Design
,
Pennsylvania Transportation and Safety
Center, Pennsylvania State University prepared for
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute of Water
Resources, May 1972 (IWR Report 72-7)
Ernst Frankel, Studies on the Future of Atlantic
Ports
, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pre-
pared for National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration, July 1973.
Gladstone Associates, Inc. Potentials for a Delaware
Deepwater Port
,




Ingalls Shipbuilding Division of Litton Industries,
Bulk Commodities Form Changes and Alternative
Transportation Modes
,
prepared for U.S. Department
of Commerce, Maritime Administration, December
1973.
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc. Institutional Im -
plications of U.S. Deepwater Port Development for
Crude Oil Imports
,
prepared for U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources,
June 1973 (IWR Report 74-4).
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, West Coast Deepwater
Port Facilities Study
,
prepared by the North and
South Pacific Division, June 1973.
Walter Yep, Japan: A Survey of Ports, Deepwater
Terminals, and Vessels
,
U.S. Army Corps of
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